Water Rights in Louisiana by Jones, Jerry G.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 16 | Number 3
April 1956
Water Rights in Louisiana
Jerry G. Jones
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Jerry G. Jones, Water Rights in Louisiana, 16 La. L. Rev. (1956)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol16/iss3/5
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL
BATON ROUGE 3, LOUISIANA
Subscription per year $5.00 (Foreign $5.50) Single copy $1.25
VOLUME XVI APRIL, 1956 NUMBER 3
STUDENT BOARD
JOHN S. WHITE, JR., Editor-in-Chief
PATRICK T. CAFFERY, Alanaging Editor
JERRY G. JONES, Associate Editor
HUNTINGTON ODOM, Associate Editor
HARRY R. SACHSE, Associate Editor
DANIEL J. SHEA, Associate Editor
EDWIN L. BLEWER, JR. JAMES M. DOZIER, JR. CIARLES W. HOWARD, JR.
ALBERT L. DIETZ, JR. DAVID M. ELLISON, JF. JESSE D. McDoNALD
WILLIAM J. DORAN, JR. THOMAS D. HARDEMAN JAMES F. PIERSON, JR.
BILLY H. HINES
FACULTY ADVISORY BOARD
DALE E. BENNETT MILTON M. HARRISON ROBERT A. PASCAL
RICHARD V. CAMPBELL PAUL M. HEBERT GEORGE W. PUGH
HARRIET S. DAOGETT HENRY G. MCMAHON CHARLES A. REYNARD
JOSEPH DAINOW WEX S. MALONE ALVIN B. RURIN
MELVIN G. DAKIN J. DENSON SMITH
LEON LEBOWITZ, Faculty Editor
BEVERLY D. WALKER, Editorial Assistant
COMMENTS
Water Rights in Louisiana
The recent adoption of legislation regulating water usage in
certain sections of Louisiana has resulted in considerable con-
fusion as to the exact principles which are to be applied in mat-
ters relating to the consumption of water. It is the purpose of
this Comment to examine the principles of water law embodied
in the Louisiana Civil Code' and to indicate how these Code
principles have been affected by the recent legislation. It will be
helpful in this respect to consider the policies concerning water
rights which have been applied in common law jurisdictions, as
many water problems are solved by interstate compact. Also, an
analysis of common law methods may be helpful as a reference
should a comprehensive scheme of water regulation be attempted
in this state.
1. For additional treatment of the subject, see Comment, 29 TUL. L. REV. 554
(1955).
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Water Rights at Common Law
Common law jurisdictions apply one of two doctrines of wa-
ter rights, either the riparian or the prior appropriation doc-
trines.2 Although the riparian doctrines has been referred to
as the "common law" concept of water rights, it is seemingly of
civilian origin. 4 Under this doctrine the sole requirement for
use of water is possession of land abutting a stream.5 Different
theories have been advanced concerning this right to use the
water in adjacent streams. The first is the "natural law" theory,
which prevails in England and several jurisdictions in this coun-
try. Under this theory, the proprietor of the land enjoys the
right of having the water flow across or adjacent to his property
in its natural state.0 This gives him the privilege to withhold
an amount of water to satisfy his own needs, and to make arti-
ficial use of the water, so long as he does not materially affect
the natural flow of the stream through the property of the down-
stream proprietor. 7 Another theory of riparian rights is that of
"reasonable use," under which each riparian proprietor has the
privilege of making beneficial use of the water for any purpose,
provided that such use does not unreasonably interfere with the
same privilege of the other riparian owners. Reasonableness is
determined in each case on the peculiar set of facts, and depends
not only upon the utility of the use itself, but also upon the
gravity of its consequences on other proprietors. In cases where
the owner desires excessive amounts of water beyond what might
be considered beneficial, the use is governed by the amount of
water in the stream available for such excessive purposes, the
2. No attempt is made in this Comment to deal at great lengths with the law
of waters in common law jurisdictions. For authoritative accounts, see LOUISIANA
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, WATER PROBLEMS IN THE SOUTHEASTERN STATES, Re-
search Report No. 5, p. 1 et seq. (mimeo., April 7, 1955) ; PROCEEDINGS, TEXAS
WATER LAW CONFERENCES (1952); Marquis, The Movement for New Water
Rights Laws in the Tennessee Valley States, 23 TENN. L. REV. 797 (1953).
3. The riparian doctrine is accepted in most of the states east of the Mis-
sissippi River, and all of the states west of the Mississippi River with the notable
exceptions of Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.
For a discussion of the riparian doctrine, see Trealease, Coordination of Riparian
and Appropriative Rights to the Use of Water, 33 TEX. L. REV. 24, 27 (1954).
4. Wiel, Waters: American Law and French Authority, 33 HARV. L. REV. 133
(1919), wherein the author cites numerous instances of Story, Kent, and An-
gelli using the phraseology of the French Civil Code in speaking of riparian rights.
5. Trealease, Coordination of Riparian and Appropriative Rights to the Use of
Water, 33 TEX. L. REV. 24, 26 (1954).
6. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, Scope Note, topic 3, c. 41, p. 339 (1939).
7. Ibid.
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number of persons who use it, the size, situation and character
of the stream, and the nature of the region.8
The second doctrine of water rights which is applied in some
common law jurisdictions is the prior appropriation doctrine.
Under this doctrine, the first to appropriate acquires the sole
right to use the water, to the exclusion of all others who may
seek to share it. Ownership of the land abutting the stream is
not essential to the existence of the right. The doctrine permits
the person who originally diverts the water for beneficial pur-
poses to maintain a preference over all others who subsequently
attempt to use the water. The doctrine originated during the
rapid growth of the mining industry in the western states, where
water shortages necessitated maximum utilization of available
water supplies.9
Another approach to water law is taken by those common
law jurisdictions which have attempted to utilize the better fea-
tures of both the riparian and prior appropriation doctrines.
One purpose in.attempting such a reconciliation of the two doc-
trines is to permit the use of water under riparian principles, but
to abolish the right of a riparian owner to assert claim to water
which he does not use but to which, under strict riparian theory,
only he would have the right.10 Non-riparian owners are thus
permitted to assert claim to the unused riparian rights. Another
purpose in such a reconciliation of the two doctrines is to estab-
lish a system of preferences. A preference exists when "the pre-
ferred use may be initiated without regard to the fact that the
supply is already fully appropriated for other purposes, and the
preferred user may take water without paying compensation to
persons whose uses are impaired."" A preference may be given
by statute for a particular purpose, or one user may be given a
preference over others, even though all may use the water for
the same purpose. A preference may also be given one user to
condemn the rights of another, provided that compensation is
8. McCook Irrigation and Water Power Co. v. Grews, 70 Neb. 109, 96 N.W.
996 (1903) ; Redwater Land and Canal Co. v. Reed, 26 S.D. 466, 128 N.W. 702(1910). Also, for legal consequences of the "reasonable use" theory, see generally
RESTATEMENT, TORTS, topic 3, c. 41, p. 344 (1939).
9. See Marquis, The Movement for New Water Rights Laws in the Tennessee
Valley States, 23 TENN. L. REv. 797, 825 (1953), and cases cited therein.
10. Trealease, Coordination of Riparian and Appropriative Rights to the Use
of Water, 33 TEx. L. REv. 24, 27 (1954).
11. Trealease, Preferences to the Use of Water, 27 RocKy MT. L. REv. 133,
134 (1955).
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given for the rights taken. 12 A study of preferences in western
states indicates that the following priorities exist: domestic and
municipal purposes which are usually superior, followed by irri-
gation, manufacturing, mining, railroad transportation, power
and navigation. 3
Louisiana Riparian Rights
Article 661 of the Louisiana Civil Code, pertaining to predial
servitudes, provides:
"He whose estate borders on running water, may use it
as it runs, for the purpose of watering his estate, or for
other purposes.
"He through whose estate water runs, whether it orig-
inates there or passes from lands above, may make use of it,
while it runs over his lands; but he cannot stop or give it
another direction, and is bound to return it to its ordinary
channel, where it leaves his estate." (Emphasis added.)
This article is a typical expression of the riparian doctrine, as
water usage is given only to those whose land abuts a stream.
Its source is apparently article 644 of the French Civil Code, 1 4
since the language of the two articles is similar. For this rea-
son, consideration of relevant French materials should prove
useful to help clarify questions arising under the Louisiana pro-
vision.
According to both the French and the Louisiana law a ripar-
ian owner is one whose land borders the stream at the time the
claim of a right to use the water is made. 1 This definition might
be of aid in applying the provisions of article 661, because, ac-
12. Ibid.
13. Id. at 158.
14. CODE CIVIL art. 644: "A person whose property is on the border of a
stream which has not been declared to belong to the Public Domain by article 538
of the title -Of Different Kinds of Property, can use the water as it flows past to
irrigate his land.
"A person through whose tenement such water flows can even use it over
the distance it runs through such tenement, provided it is put back in its ordinary
channel when it leaves his tenement." (As translated by Henry Cachard, 1930) ;
3 AUBRY ET RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 76 (5th ed. 1900) ; 1 COLIN
ET CAPITANT, TRAITP DE DROIT CIVIL 1583 (19.53) ; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TBAITA
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 494 (1952).
15. 7 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 327 (2d ed. 1876). See
Doiron v. O'Bryan, 218 La. 1069, 1081, 51 So.2d 628 (1951), where the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court gave a similar construction to the term when it said:
"Riparian rights are the rights of owners of land on the banks of watercourses
relating to water [and] its use." (Emphasis added.)
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'cording to the equivalent French provision, non-riparian owners
have no right to the water. 6 The question might arise as to the
effect of a separation, such as a road, between the property and
the stream. Whether or not the owner of the property thus sep-
arated has the right to use the water depends upon the title to
the roadbed. If the roadbed is owned by the adjacent landowner,
and is merely burdened with a servitude of passage, the Louisi-
ana courts have held the owner remains a riparian owner, be-
cause title to the roadbed remains in him.' 7 If, however, the
roadbed is owned entirely by one not the riparian owner, the
strict French approach is that the front proprietor loses all inter-
est he possessed in the water, and the owner of the bed of the
road becomes the new riparian owner.' Another question which
may be of importance is the effect to be given the situation where
the bed of the stream changes. If the bed of the stream changes
so that the estate no longer borders on the stream, again under
the French view, the right of the proprietor to use the water has
terminated.1 9 Under this strict interpretation, irrigation works
to conduct the water to the former riparian estate presumably
would not be permitted, as the necessary physical relationship
between estate and stream no longer exists.
Although article 661 involves a servitude to use water, it may
be helpful to determine the question of ownership of the "run-
ning water" to which it refers. According to article 450 of the
Code, running water is classified as res communes, that is, the
ownership belongs to no one in particular and all men may use it
freely, conformably with the use for which nature intended it.
Almost identical wording can be found in Roman2 ° and Spanish 2'
property law. At Roman law, however, water could become sus-
ceptible of ownership once extracted from the stream. 22 This
same reasoning could be applied in Louisiana, for although ar-
ticle 482 of the Civil Code23 speaks of common things as being
16. See 3 AUBRY ET IAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 48 (5th ed. 1900).
17. Delachaise v. Mongennis, 44 La. Ann. 1043 (1892).
18. 3 AUBRY ET RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 48 (5th ed. 1900).
19. See entry on "servitudes" in [1884] Dalloz, Jurisprudence I. 277, I. 187.
20. INSTITUTES 2.1.1: "By natural law the following things belong to all men,
namely: air, running water, the sea, and for this reason the shores of the sea."
(Emphasis added.)
21. 1 LAWS OF LAS SIETE PARTIDAS 335 (Moreau-Lislet & Carleton transl.
1820): "The things which belong in common, to all the living creatures of this
world, are, the air, rain, water, the sea and its shores; for every living creature
may use them, according to their wants."
22. 1 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS 962 (2d ed. 1912).
23. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 482 (1870) : "Among those which are not susceptible of
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insusceptible of ownership, it also refers to things in common
of which all men have the enjoyment and use. Thus, segregation
of water is authorized and it would seem to follow that, once
separated, it would become the property of him who appropriates
it, and no longer be subject to the use of others. This conclusion
would not violate the basic proposition that the corpus of the
water is insusceptible of ownership, as the water remaining in
the stream would be a common thing, owned by no one.
Although this classification of running water as a common
thing may have been possible originally under the Code, subse-
quent legislation appears to have eliminated this interpretation.
R.S. 9 :110124 provides that "the waters of and in all bayous,
rivers, streams, lagoons, lakes, and bays.., not under the direct
ownership of any person on August 12, 1910, are declared to be
the property of the State. There shall never be any charge as-
sessed against any person for the use of the waters of the State
for municipal, industrial, agricultural or domestic purposes."
The effect of this statute is to exclude running water from those
common things enumerated in article 450 of the Civil Code and
classify it as res publicae, that is, property vested in a nation
which may be used by all its citizens. 25 The statute expressly
provides that waters under private ownership on August 12,
1910, are not affected. However, under article 450 of the Civil
Code, running water is a common thing insusceptible of private
ownership and thus could not have been owned by anyone at any-
time. R.S. 9:1101, raising as it does the inference that there
could have been private ownership of running water before Au-
gust 12, 1910, seems irreconcilable with article 450 of the Civil
Code. Although the Legislature must have been primarily con-
cerned With the ownership of beds of streams and not the water,
waters are specifically mentioned in the legislation.2 6
A similar problem is whether the term "running water" in
article 661 includes both navigable and non-navigable streams.
Under article 644 of the Code Civil,27 comparable to article 661
of the Louisiana Code, the term "running water" refers only to
water in non-navigable streams. However, unlike the Code Civil,
ownership, there are some which can never become the object of it; as things in
common, of which all men have the enjoyment and use." (Emphasis added.)
24. LA. R.S. 9:1101 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1954, No. 443, p. 834.
25. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 453 (1870).
26. See Note, 15 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 463 (1955).
27. See note 14 supra.
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the equivalent article in the Louisiana Code is not confined to
non-navigable streams. It is arguable that the redactors meant
to include both navigable and non-navigable streams under the
term "running water" in article 661. On the other hand, R.S.
9:1101,28 providing for state ownership of the waters of all
streams, does definitely make some qualification as to the types
of streams from which water may be appropriated. It provides
that if the water is contained in a navigable stream, the state
may divest its citizens of the right of use by entering into pos-
session of the waters. Conversely, no provision is made for di-
vestment by the state of riparian owners who use water from
non-navigable streams. The right to use the water of non-navi-
gable streams, therefore, is governed only by article 661. As re-
gards navigable streams, the provisions of article 661 appear to
have been restricted by R.S. 9:1101, since the right to use those
waters may be divested by the state.
The classification of running water as a common thing in the
Code and as a public thing in the Revised Statutes would lead to
the conclusion that any person has the right to use the water,
29
with the qualification that in neither case is the water susceptible
of private ownership. But this right would seem to be limited
by article 661 to those whose estates border on a stream or
through whose estate water runs. In France, this problem is
treated somewhat differently3 0 Article 644 of the French Civil
Code, comparable to Louisiana article 661, provides for use by
riparian owners only. Special legislation provides that non-.
riparian owners may apply to administrative agencies for au-
thority to irrigate lands. Thus, the right to use water is provided
both riparian and non-riparian owners. Provisions for non-
riparian use were completely excluded by the redactors of the
Louisiana Civil Code. Likewise, the Code is virtually silent as
to what purposes of use are to be given preference. The only
right granted by article 661 which might be considered a prefer-
ence as to purpose of use is in the provision that "he whose estate
borders on running water, may use it as it runs, for the purpose
of watering his estate, or for other purposes." (Emphasis add-
28. LA. R.S. 9:1101 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1954, No. 443, p. 834.
29. The definitions of public and common things usually connote that every-
one has the use of the things, but not the ownership.
30. 3 AUBRY ET RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 60 (5th ed. 1900) ; 1
COLIN ET CAPITANT, TRA1Tt DE DROIT CIVIL 1583 (1953); 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT,
TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL .FRANQAIS 494 (1952); 2 PICARD, TRAITk DES
EAUX 59, as translated in 6 CALIF. L. REV. 342, 370 (1918).
[Vol. XVI
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ed.) Just what is meant by the phrase "for other purposes" is
an open question. Likewise open is the question of the amount
of water that may be taken by the riparian owner. 1
The rights granted to riparian owners by article 661 are
qualified by other provisions of the Code. The front proprietor,
for example, may not transfer his right to the use of the water
to a non-riparian owner, as articles 652, 653, and 654 provide
that servitudes are non-transferable separate and apart from
the dominant estate. 32 Thus, the only transfers of the right of
water usage permitted are those accomplished by a transfer of
the title in the riparian estate. Where the front proprietor ac-
quires land not bordering a stream, but which is adjacent to his
riparian estate, there may be a difference of opinion as to
whether or not he may use the water to benefit the land which
does not abut the stream. Article 777 of the Louisiana Civil
Code33 prohibits the transfer of the exercise of a servitude by
the owner of the servient estate to a place different from that
to which it was originally assigned. The theory is that by mak-
ing such a transfer of the exercise of the servitude an increased
burden is placed on the dominant estate. If the water is used to
serve land which does not abut the stream, other riparian own-
31. For a discussion of the amount of water that may be taken, see 5 LABOR!,
REPERTOIRE DE DROIT FRANVAIS 414 (1881), as translated in WVeil, Origin and
Comparative Development of the Law of Vatercourses in the Common Law and
in the Civil Law, 6 CALIF. L. REV. 245, 263 (1917), wherein it is said: "The
riparian proprietors have, in fact, an equal right to the use of the water, and
aside from that, it is proper to regulate this use to the end that each of the
riparian owners may count upon a share as near equal as possible of what water
there is."
The Louisiana Code of 1808 contained a provision that empowered the judge
to balance the interests when determining the proper amount of water to be
taken, but this was excluded from the Civil Code of 1825, because it contained
advice rather than command. See Compiled Editions of the Civil Codes of Lou-
isiana, 1 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES 71, Comment of Redactors (1937).
32. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 652, 653, 654 (1870). 7 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE
DROIT CIVIL FRANUAIS 356 (2d ed. 1876) : "The quality of being riparian does
not transfer itself by means of the agreement to those who do not possess any-
thing along the rivers, hence the rights attached to the quality of being riparian
are equally non-transferable to others as well as to the riparian owners."
33. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 777 (1870) : "The owner of the estate which owes
the servitude can do nothing tending to diminish its use, or to make it more in-
convenient.
"Thus he can not change the condition of the premises, nor transfer the exer-
cise of the servitude to a place different from that on which it was assigned in
the first instance.
"Yet if this primitive assignment has become more burdensome to the owner
of the estate which owes the servitude, or if he is thereby prevented from making
advantageous repairs on his estate, he may offer to the owner of the other estate
a place equally convenient for the exercise of his rights, and the owner of the
estate to which the servitude is due can not refuse it."
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
ers might well suffer as a result of the smaller volume of water
which reaches them. Article 777 appears to prohibit such con-
duct by the servient owner upstream, and might well be used by
the courts to prevent the exercise of the servitude on lands which
do not form part of a contiguous riparian estate. However, this
argument may not be completely valid when it is considered that
article 777 is a rule of conventional servitudes, and article 661
concerns servitudes that originate from the natural situation of
the places. French writers, commenting on similar situations in
their Code, contend that rules of conventional servitudes cannot
be applied to the rules of natural servitudes.84 Following this
strict French approach, it would seem possible to apply the pro-
visions in article 661 to any land acquired by the riparian owner,
whether contiguous to the riparian estate or not. It is submitted,
however, that the true implication of article 661 is that its appli-
cation should be restricted. As thus applied there could be no
utilization of the riparian right on any land acquired subsequent
to the time the initial claim of use is made.
Termination of riparian rights by prescription," a subject of
much litigation in other states,3 0 is not likely to present a problem
in Louisiana. Article 795 of the Louisiana Civil Code3 7 provides
that the normal ten-year prescriptive period for non-usage of
servitudes does not run where the servitude is one that originates
from the natural situation of the places. One French writer con-
cludes that "the right cannot be lost to those to whom it is vested,
merely by non-use; it matters little that the other riparian own-
ers have enjoyed the water to a greater extent than they could
have done if the co-riparian owner had himself exercised his
right; he may always complain of an excessive use of the other
riparian owners with a view to himself enjoying a right which
he had kept in reserve, however long his inaction may have
lasted. ' '38 An analogous situation has arisen in Louisiana involv-
ing drainage. In Becknell v. Weindha139 an action was brought
to prevent the obstruction of what plaintiff claimed was the nat-
34. 5 LAoRi, REPERTOIRE DE DROIT FRANVAIS 413 (1881).
35. See, generally, Comment, 1.5 LouiSIANA LAW REVIEW 777 (1955).
36. Craig, Prescriptive Water Rights in California and the Necessity for a
Valid Statutory Appropriation, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 219 (1954), and authorities
cited therein.
37. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 795 (1870) : "Prescription for non-usage does not take
place against natural or necessary servitudes, which originate from the situation
of the places."
38. 5 LABORI, REPERTOIRE DE DROIT FRANCAIS 415 (1881).
39. 7 La. Ann. 291 (1852).
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ural drain of the land. The Louisiana Supreme Court, contrary
to article 795 and the view of the French authorities, held that
when the works are made openly, and in the presence of the party
who has a right to object to them, and he does not object, the
implied acquiescence is considered a waiver of the right of servi-
tude. This theory of waiver may be an exception made by the
court to the general rule of article 795. On the other hand, it
may be argued that prescription was not involved in the case,
as plaintiff had not lost the right of servitude by failure to make
use of it, but rather had lost it by failure to make objection to
the construction which had damaged his estate. Moreover, the
court was influenced in its determination by what it considered
to be the best interests of agriculture.
Administrative Regulation
Three agencies, irrigation districts,40 the Sabine River Au-
thority,41 and the Southwest Water Conservation District,42 are
given authority to control water usage in designated areas. The
legislation creating these agencies is not intended as a compre-
hensive scheme of water law, as each statute was adopted to
meet the needs immediately presented. Also, the creation of these
agencies does not seem consistent with the riparian doctrine ex-
pressed in article 661 of the Civil Code. An examination of this
legislation will reveal several of these inconsistencies.
Irrigation districts may be created by the police jury of any
parish "for the purpose of constructing and operating canals for
irrigation by gravity.' '44 The powers granted such corporations 45
are almost plenary, including the general power of expropria-
tion. Exclusive control of the water within the established dis-
trict is in the governing agency. There is an absence in the
statute of any protection for riparian owners who have acquired
rights under article 661. Thus, under this legislation, the location
of the land with relation to a stream is insignificant in determin-
ing rights to appropriate water for irrigation purposes.
40. LA. R.S. 38:2101 et seq. (1950).
41. Id. 38:2321 et seq.
42. Id. 38:2501 et seq.
43. For a discussion of the operation of these agencies, see LOUISIANA LEGIS-
LATIVE COUNCIL, WATER PROBLEMS IN THE SOUTHEASTERN STATES, Research Re-
port No. 5, p. 24 et seq. (mimeo., April 7, 1955).
44. LA. R.S. 38:2101 (1950).
45. State v. Coulon, 197 La. 1058, 3 So.2d 241 (1941).
1956]
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The Sabine River Authority is authorized to provide irriga-
tion within the watershed of the Sabine River and its tributaries
for agricultural purposes and for equitable distribution to all
other uses. 46 Again, the statute makes no mention of the ripar-
ian rights acquired by authority of article 661. The obvious con-
clusion is that the Legislature intended to supersede that article,
and rely on the discretion of the Authority to provide for an
equitable distribution of water.
The Southwest Louisiana Water Conservation District, com-
prising a much larger area than that authorized to the preceding
agencies,47 was created in 1954 to furnish fresh water to all lands
within the designated area for domestic, municipal, irrigational
and industrial purposes. Authority is granted to tax and to pur-
chase facilities for the distribution and sale of water. While the
district may sell water, the statute provides that no charge shall
be assessed which would have the effect of impairing vested
water rights.48 Thus, a riparian owner within the jurisdiction
of the district is free to use the water if he can show that his
rights are vested by virtue of article 661. The legislation creat-
ing the district also conflicts with R.S. 9:1101, which provides
that no charge shall be assessed for the use of water from any
stream within the state. However, R.S. 9:1101 is not controlling
as it is the earlier expression of the legislative will.
Conclusion
As previously noted, the basic legislation governing water
usage is article 661 of the Civil Code. This article has become
virtually meaningless in those areas where irrigation is con-
trolled by administrative agencies. Further doubt has been cast
upon the usefulness of article 661 by the enactment of R.S.
9:1101 declaring all waters to be the property of the state, with
the privilege of free use by everyone. Granting that article 661
may be construed as not having been affected by the above legis-
lation, if the general rules of servitude are applied to that article,
many inequitable results follow. 49 An illustration is the pro-
46. LA. R.S. 38:2321 (1950).
47. The district encompasses the parishes of Acadia, Allen, Beauregard, Cal-
casieu, Cameron, Evangeline, Iberia, Jefferson Davis, Lafayette, St. Landry, Ver-
milion and that portion of the Parish of St. Martin lying west of the Atchafalaya
River. LA. R.S. 38:2503 (1950).
48. LA. R.S. 38:2504 (1950).
49. See Nabors, Report on Mineral Law, 25 TUL. L. REv. 30, 33 (1950), where-
in the author criticizes the technique of analogizing obscure servitude articles to
[Vol. XVI
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hibition against the riparian owner's use of the water to serve
non-riparian lands adjoining his riparian estate, but which have
been purchased subsequent to the initial exercise of the servitude.
It is submitted that the solution to the problem lies in the adop-
tion of comprehensive legislation designed to treat all related
problems of water law. The present system, composed only of
statutes passed to meet limited problems, has produced a number
of conflicts from which inequitable results are apt to follow.
Jerry G. Jones
The Effect of Insanity at the Time of Marriage
It is almost universally accepted that the marriage of an
insane person is null. However, there exists considerable di-
versity of opinion as to the nature and effect of such nullity. A
brief survey of various legal systems is offered as foundation
for a discussion of the problems which the subject raises under
the law of Louisiana.1
In Other Legal Systems
The Canon Law Code 2 does not mention insanity in its enu-
meration of the impediments to marriage.3 The canonists em-
ploy a strict definition of the term impediment, that is, "a cir-
cumstance attaching to the person which . . .renders his mar-
riage either illicit or invalid."'4 By this is meant a condition
of a person by reason of which he is forbidden either to marry
or to marry certain persons. On the other hand, insanity in its
relation to the marriage contract is considered to be a circum-
stance affecting consent rather than the person. The effect of
insanity on marriage is drawn from the wording of Canon 10815
solve problems in the field of mineral law. The present writer feels this same
position may be taken by the court in matters of water law if legislative reform
does not remedy the situation.
1. A discussion of the subject with respect to (a) degrees of insanity and
(b) intoxication as having the effect of insanity is not within the scope of this
Comment. See generally Annots., 28 A.L.R. 635, 648 (1924). See McCurdy,
Insanity as a Ground for Annulment or Divorce in English or American Law, 29
VA. L. REV. 771, 790 (1943), for a discussion of insanity in divorce law.
2. CODEX CANONICI JURIS (1918).
3. The dirament (annulling) impediments are enumerated and defined in
Canons 1067 through 1080 and the impedient impediments (rendering a marriage
illicit but not null) in Canons 1058 through 1066.
4. BOUSCAREN & ELLIS, CANON LAW: A TEXT AND COMMENTARY 481-85,
Canon 1035, commentaries 1, 2 (2d ed. 1951).
5. CODEX CANONICI JuRIs, Canon 1081 (1918).
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